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Abstract:  This paper examines the impact of the European Union-South Africa 
Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (EU-SA TDCA) on trade 
between the RSA and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). The 
results indicate that demand for imports are income elastic and price inelastic. 
This implies that imported goods are necessary and consumers and producers 
of the BLNS countries depend on them. The results also indicate that the 
agreement between the RSA and the EU brought about increased imports to the 
BLNS countries. Demand for exports is also income elastic and price inelastic. 
The volume of exports to the RSA, from the BLNS, seems to increase following 
the agreement. The empirical findings imply first, that imports could have led 
to a crowding out of domestic production, which would negatively impact on 
domestic industry. Second, the EU-SA TDCA has benefited the BLNS countries 
by boosting their exports. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A free trade agreement (FTA) is a preferential arrangement among countries 
in which tariff rates among them are reduced to zero. However, different members 
of the arrangement may set external tariff for non- members at different rates 
(Krueger, 1997). FTAs are designed to liberalize trade between economies as 
countries seek to open up opportunities for productive commercial partnerships and 
other forms of cooperation.  
European Union-South Africa Trade Development and Cooperation 
Agreement (EU-SA TDCA) is the first reciprocal free trade agreement in Southern 
Africa and became fully implemented in the year 2004. The RSA signed a free 
trade agreement with the European Union in October 1999. The implementation 
date of the agreement was set for January 1
st 2000 (Assarson, 2005).  
This followed the completion of the ratification procedures by the EU 
member states and the RSA Parliament. The trade liberalization between the EU 
and the RSA is asymmetric in the sense that the liberalization period is different for 
the two parties. The RSA has 12 years to fully implement the agreement, while the 
EU has only 10 years. Furthermore, the RSA was to liberalize around 86%t of its 
imports from the EU, while the respective figure for the EU is 95% t. The EU-SA 
TDCA covers around 83% t and 86.5% of South Africa’s agriculture and industrial 
sectors, respectively, while for the EU, the corresponding figures are 61.4% and 
99.98%.
25 
Although the EU-SA TDCA was signed between the EU and the RSA, it 
applies  de facto to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). The 
BLNS states are in the Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU) with the RSA. 
Therefore, by default, the BLNS countries have become party to the EU-SA TDCA 
with respect to imports from the EU. Although the BLNS states are no contracting 
parties to this free trade agreement, the porous nature of the BLNS borders implies 
that goods entering the RSA market under the free trade agreement could easily 
end up in the BLNS. Therefore, this makes BLNS countries the de facto members 
of the EU-SA TDCA.  
Additionally, an important feature of the EU-SA TDCA is the implicit 
asymmetry of trade liberalization between the EU and the BLNS countries. Even 
though the EU-SA TDCA effectively grants the EU free access to the markets of 
the BLNS countries, it does not grant the BLNS countries reciprocal access to the THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION - SOUTH AFRICA TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION…  
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markets of the EU.
26 This poses immediate questions about the EU-SA TDCA 
effects upon the other members of the SACU of which the RSA is the dominant 
member. This agreement has had the potential to impact the BLNS countries in a 
number of ways. Firstly, impacts of the EU-SA TDCA are of a more dynamic 
nature in terms of increased imports and exports competition for the products. 
Secondly, this agreement has to lead to substantial reduction in the revenue that 
accrued to SACU common revenue pool, as a direct outcome of tariff reductions. 
So, reduction of the tariffs means the loss of revenue by the BLNS countries’ 
governments. This is because the common external tariff that used to apply to the 
EU has been removed by the agreement. This paper, therefore, attempts to examine 
the impact of the EU-SA TDCA on the BNLS countries with the RSA. 
Specifically, it investigates if there has been any effect of the EU-SA TDCA on the 
trade of the BNLS countries with the RSA 
The aim of this paper is to examine the possible impact of the EU-SA TDCA 
on the trade patterns between Republic of South Africa (RSA) and the BLNS 
countries. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief history of 
SACU as well as the state of each country’s bilateral trade with the RSA. Section 3 
reviews the literature, while Section 4 discusses the methodological framework that 
the study uses for estimating the results. . Section 5 reports the estimation and 
analyses the results of the study. Lastly, conclusions are discussed in Section 6. 
AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES AND INTRA-SACU TRADE 
  The RSA is the largest trading partner for the BLNS countries within the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). It is considered to be the biggest and 
the most developed economy in the region, hence essential for these countries. 
Thus, whatever effects accrue as a result of it forming the trade agreement with the 
EU is likely to affect BLNS states. The agreement between the EU and the RSA 
therefore raises concerns as to whether it will have any negative effects on the 
BLNS countries. For instance, the agreement may divert exports and imports of the 
RSA away from the BLNS countries to the EU. The BLNS countries are likely to 
face both import and export competition from the EU.  
                                                                                                                             
25 Source: ANNEX 4 South Africa, Trade Policy Review, WT/TPR/S/114/ZAF 
26  This assumes the rules of origin are effective Montseng TSOLO , Imogen Bonolo MOGOTSI , Gaotlhobogwe MOTLALENG 
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Since the agreement was signed, around 40% of the RSA’s imports are 
sourced from the EU27. Due to intra-SACU free movements of goods it means that 
these imports will find their way into the BLNS countries. The problem 
encountered by the BLNS countries is that it may not be possible for them to 
formulate trade policies independently given the limited degree of freedom in tariff 
policies and the dominance of the RSA. Thus, domestic BNLS industries are likely 
to face competition of imports from the EU as prices from the EU are likely to be 
lower (a case of trade creation). This can result in local industries having to close 
down because they cannot compete with the lower prices of the EU exports. This 
can have a negative implication for the infant industries in the BLNS countries 
because of the heavier competition from the manufactured exports from 
industrialized nations of Europe. Thus, the enlarged market for the European goods 
can result in de-industrialization of the BLNS countries (Jachia and Teljeur (1999); 
Motlaleng (2004)). 
Furthermore, since imports from the EU now enter the RSA at reduced 
tariffs, the implication is that SACU faces a significant amount of revenue 
reductions. SACU is based upon a common external tariff (CET) around all five 
members. This has been reduced because of the free trade agreement between the 
RSA and the EU. The common revenue pool for customs and excise receipts is 
expected to have shrunk, leaving lesser funds for distribution among the SACU 
members. The distribution of funds is made in such a way that smaller countries 
receive a large share of custom revenues as opposed to larger countries. This works 
in favour of the BLNS countries. Therefore, a fall in tariffs means these countries 
are the ones which are likely to be more negatively affected.   
Brief History of SACU  
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) dates back to June 29
th 1910. 
This was when the RSA, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana signed an agreement at 
Potchefstroom in the RSA to enter into a customs union. Only Britain and the RSA 
were involved in the 1910 negotiations. This agreement lasted until the British 
Protectorates received independence in the mid 1960s. Thereafter, the agreement 
was re-negotiated by the newly independent states in 1969. The 1969 Agreement 
attracted widespread attention from economists and political commentators. It 
effectively ensured that throughout the sanctions period that the RSA faced, the 
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three frontline states (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) continued to depend on 
the RSA for their imports and to a lesser extent their exports (Kirk et al, 2003). 
When Namibia attained its independence from South Africa in 1990 it also became 
a member of SACU.  
 The 1969 agreement included a revenue sharing formula for the division of 
customs and excise revenue collected in the union. The BLNS received a 
significant proportion of their government revenue through this formula. According 
to Flatters et al (2005), this revenue sharing formula specified BLNS entitlements 
to the total customs and excise duty collections, and the RSA received the residual 
amount. These BLNS entitlements meant that the smaller member states received 
their shares based on the total imports and excisable production independently of 
the actual revenue collections. As the residual claimant, the RSA absorbed all the 
revenue impacts of changes in imports of the other members. Against this 
background the smaller members of SACU expected that upon the formation of the 
first the RSA government of national unity in April 1994, negotiations would begin 
for a new reconstituted and democratized SACU. This culminated in a new 
agreement signed in 2002. 
The new (2002) SACU Agreement 
The new agreement constituted a fundamental change. Unilateral dominance 
by the RSA was being replaced by a democratic dispensation. The essence of the 
new revenue formula is that the RSA no longer receives its share of revenue as the 
residual, but shares on the same basis as the BLNS countries. The extent to which 
the BNLS countries rely on SACU revenue sharing formula for a significant share 
of total budget revenue is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 SACU Revenue Payments under the current (2002)  
Revenue Sharing Formula, 2006 
 
SACU Payment 
(R million) 
% of Revenue 
Pool 
% of Total 
Government Revenue 
(excl. grants) 
Botswana 5,634 17.8 20.1 
Lesotho 2,836 9.0 53.0 
Namibia 5,463 17.3 41.0 
Swaziland 3,708 11.7 56.9 
RSA 17,625 55.8 3.9 
Source: budget documentation from the five member states.   
 Montseng TSOLO , Imogen Bonolo MOGOTSI , Gaotlhobogwe MOTLALENG 
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Table 10 shows how dependent the BLNS countries are on income from the 
SACU Revenue Pool. Lesotho,  Namibia and Swaziland remain dependent on 
SACU revenue for between  40% to  50 % of their government revenue.  Botswana 
is an exception to this as its dependency on SACU revenue is around 13% of the 
total government revenue. Moreover, the revenue share to each member is now 
calculated from the three basic components, which: are a share of custom 
component, a share of the excise component and a share of a development 
component. The custom component distributes the custom revenues on the basis 
that, a country that has a largest share of intra-SACU imports gets the highest 
custom revenue. The excise component distributes the revenues according to the 
share of a country’s GDP, while the development component adjust the shares of 
excise pool according to the inverse of each country’s GDP per capita.  The 
existence of this current revenue arrangement does not benefit the RSA, as opposed 
to the old sharing formula. This is because it no longer receives its share of revenue 
as the residual claimant, but shares on the same basis as other member countries. 
Intra-Regional Trade 
The SACU region is dominated by the RSA, which accounts for 87% of the 
population, and 93% of the GDP of the customs area (World Bank, 2000). While 
the RSA has developed a significant manufacturing and industrial capacity, the 
other countries remain dependent on agriculture and mineral extraction. Due to 
their different economic development agendas, the RSA and the BLNS countries 
pursue different industrialization strategies. Thus, while the RSA wants to protect 
its capital intensive industries, such as automotive industry, this is not in the best 
interest of the BLNS countries. They would like to benefit from cheaper inputs and 
consumer goods.  In terms of trade, the BLNS countries depend heavily on the 
RSA for a significant proportion of their trade, investment and in some cases 
(migrant) employment. They source most of their imports from the RSA, although 
their exports are more geographically diverse. The commodity pattern of the RSA’s 
exports to the BLNS differs significantly from its exports to the rest of the world. 
Whereas the RSA continues to export predominantly resource-based goods overall, 
the BLNS represent a significant market for the RSA’s consumer goods and 
services (Kirk et al, 2003).  
 THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION - SOUTH AFRICA TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION…  
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The BLNS economies and their trade with the RSA can be considered as 
follows. With regard to Swaziland, agriculture forms the backbone of its economic 
activity. Growth in Swaziland manufacturing output picked up in 2007 following 
the positive performance of some export commodities. These, include sugar, sugar-
based products, wood-pulp and timber products, meat and meat products, soft 
drinks concentrates, citrus and zippers. Also, the stronger than anticipated 
economic performance by the RSA in 2007 boosted Swaziland’s export demand. 
This is because 50% of the country’s exports are destined for the RSA (CBS 
Annual Report, 2007/2008). In 2007, imports from the RSA amounted to 92%, 
while exports to the RSA accounted for 62% of Swaziland’s exports.  (CBS, 
Quarterly Review, 2008).
28     
In the case of Namibia, over 70% of its imports originate in the RSA. Also, 
many Namibian exports are destined for the RSA market or transit that country. 
Specifically, in 2007, imports sourced from and exports to the RSA amounted to 
78.1% and 29%, respectively (BoN factsheet, 2007). Namibia's exports consist 
mainly of diamonds and other minerals, fish products, beef and meat products, 
grapes and light manufactures. The country’s main imports are food and live 
animals, oil and chemical products, aircraft and ship products, and mineral 
products.  
A similar situation is found for the Botswana’s economy: the country’s trade 
relationship is highly concentrated in a limited number of countries. The RSA is 
the largest supplier of imports. Botswana’s imports are predominantly vehicles and 
transport equipment, machinery and electrical equipments, beverages and tobacco, 
metal and metal products. In terms of direction of trade, imports of the country 
amounted to P24.9 billion in 2007. Out of these, imports from CCA (mainly RSA) 
amounted to P20.9 billion, thus constituting 84% of total imports of Botswana 
(CSO, 2007).  On the other hand, The RSA is not the major destination of 
Botswana’s exports. Only 11% of Botswana’s exports went to CCA during that 
period. Diamonds are the major export commodity of Botswana. They constitute 
about 62% of the total exports. These are destined for the United States and Japan.  
The economy of Lesotho is based on subsistence farming and animal 
husbandry. There is also small-scale industries that include clothing, footwear, 
textiles, food processing and construction. Lesotho’s imports are sourced from the 
RSA, which completely surrounds the country. These include various items used 
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for immediate consumption, especially food items. About 82% of Lesotho imports 
originate from the SACU region, but largely reflects imports from the RSA.   
Lesotho’s imports from the RSA have experienced a growth rate of 21.7% during 
the periods 1999-2003. On the other hand, export growth to the RSA was 17.1% 
for the same period. From the above, it is noticeable that the BNLS countries 
depend on the RSA for their imports, and to a lesser extent exports, in particular, 
non-traditional exports. 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
When countries enter into a free trade agreement, changes in trade flows 
arise due to changed conditions of competition. Viner (1950) classified these 
processes as trade creation and trade diversion. In his classical consideration, when 
a developing country enters into an FTA with an industrialized country, trade 
diversion effects are likely to dominate in the third countries due to complementary 
production and trade structures. This is due to the fact that third countries export 
predominantly primary and low skilled, labour intensive goods, while the import is 
dominated by high-skilled, capital intensive commodities. However, this theory 
was criticized on the basis that developing countries would benefit from an FTA 
with an industrialized country due to their different factor endowment. This would 
then enable developing countries to import cheap, capital-intensive goods and 
export labour intensive manufactures, thus, stimulating division of labour. Also, it 
might help them to develop their industrial capacities due to protected access to a 
larger market provided it is strong (Meyn, 2003).  
Some authors postulate that a free trade agreement is likely to affect partners 
differently. Finger et al (1979) and later Pomfret (1986) argued that one of the 
determining factors is the extent of trade overlapping between the signatory and the 
remaining non-signatory partners. The overlapping should be measured, however, 
separately for imports and exports.  In most cases, it appears that FTAs lead to both 
trade diversion and creation with the net effects determined by the structure of the 
FTA. Therefore, even if two or more countries are moving toward freer trade 
among themselves  the FTA could make those countries and the world as a whole 
worse off. This can arise if the FTA diverts more trade than it creates, according to 
economic theory. This conclusion is called the General Theory of the Second Best 
(Cooper, 2005).  THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION - SOUTH AFRICA TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION…  
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There is substantial empirical review on the estimation of FTA effects. Much 
of this uses econometric methods including gravity and analytical models, together 
with the general equilibrium models. A study by Neyapti et al (2003) estimated 
import and export functions of Turkey with the EU and non-EU countries using 
panel data set. The study investigated whether the custom union between the EU 
and Turkey affected Turkey’s trade. The findings indicated that both exports and 
imports of Turkey had been positively affected by the custom union. They were 
also sensitive to income and price changes. However, the responsiveness of 
Turkey’s trade to income and price changes differed for trade with the EU and non-
EU group of countries. For the EU countries, Turkey’s income elasticity of both 
imports and exports were lower as compared to the non-EU countries, especially 
for the custom union period.  The effect of exchange rate on exports was found to 
be stronger for the custom union period.  This situation was explained by the 
increased imports during the period of largely overvalued Turkish Lira (TL), 
especially for the period 1993-2000. For imports, real appreciation of TL, has had a 
positive impact on imports especially for the EU countries, though not in the 
custom union period. 
 
Another study on EU-SA FTA was undertaken by Assarson (2005) where he 
investigated the impact the agreement had on the RSA’s trade with Southern Africa 
and the rest of the world. He used trade statistics for the periods 1999-2004 
between the RSA and its trading partners to symbolize trade before and after the 
implementation of the agreement. In this way, the study could easily compare and 
discover possible changes in the trade patterns since the agreement was 
implemented. The study showed that the RSA has increased both its exports to and 
imports from almost all countries, although exports to the BLNS countries 
declined. The RSA’s exports to these countries had been sporadic so it was difficult 
to state if the negative trend was a result of the EU-SA FTA or not. However, the 
study argued that these countries had been negatively affected by the agreement 
when considering the negative percentage changes in RSA’s exports during the 
period 1999-2004. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study adopts the methodology used by Neyapti et al (2003) on Turkey 
to estimate the impact of EU-SA TDCA on the BNLS countries. They investigated 
whether custom union between the EU and Turkey affected Turkey’s trade. This 
paper however, uses different variables of demand for exports and imports of the 
BLNS countries.  Montseng TSOLO , Imogen Bonolo MOGOTSI , Gaotlhobogwe MOTLALENG 
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Several hypotheses about the import and export demand have been tested by 
the empirical studies reviewed. The two variables or determinants remained 
central, income and price effects. This is due to the fact that policy makers are 
often concerned with the magnitude of these effects because of their 
macroeconomic impact (Cedepa, 2002).
29 According to Mervar (1993), the 
conventional model for estimating export demand equation suggests the following 
relation: 
     (1) 
Where:   stands for quantity of exports,  
            = income of the importing region (+) 
              price of the exported good’s own price (-) 
               price of imperfect substitutes on the foreign market (+)  
          and signs in parentheses represent  the respective hypotheses. 
 
Equation 1 can be linearized and expressed as follows: 
     (2) 
Traditional aggregate demand function for imports is, therefore, represented 
by the following relation: 
    (3) 
Where:   represents quantity of imports,  
             = income of the importing (domestic) country (+) 
             = price of the imperfect substitutes on the domestic market (+) 
             = price of the imported good (-) 
 
The linear function of the above model is specified as follows: 
     (4) 
 Although the above approach has been predominant in the empirical 
literature, it has remained controversial. This is due to the fact that prices of 
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exports/imports and domestic prices are expected to be correlated. Due to this 
limitation, some studies such as those by Khan (1974) used the relative prices, 
which are expected to eliminate any multi-collinearity problems that might arise 
due to correlation between these variables. However, the use of relative prices has 
also posed some problems. Specially, when dealing with bilateral trade. Bahmani-
Oskooee and Goswani (2004) argued that when considering bilateral trade, import 
and export prices are not available on bilateral basis to be included in export and 
import demand functions. This is an important issue due to the fact that a country 
exports and imports different commodities to different trading partners. The 
remedy here is to consider exports and imports value, and try to determine how 
sensitive they are to a change in exchange rate. This is a direct method of 
determining whether currency depreciation is effective in increasing or decreasing 
trade with the trading partner. Thus, the country’s exports and imports functions, in 
value can be re-written as follows: 
     (7) 
     (8) 
Where:  = Real bilateral exchange rate and is calculated as follows: 
 
  = domestic currency per country i’s currency 
 = price level of country i 
 = price level of the domestic country 
According to Doroodian et al (1994), the log-linear formulation for these 
demand functions is deemed to be more appropriate than the linear one. This is due 
to the fact that the parameter estimates can be directly interpreted as elasticities 
without further computations 
    The model shown above (equations 7 and 8) is what the paper adopts for 
analyzing the impact of EU-SA TDCA on BLNS countries. It is similar to the 
methodology used by Neyapti et al (2003). They used both import and export 
demand functions to determine whether Turkey’s trade had been affected by the 
European Union Agreement. Their analysis involved more than 150 EU and non-
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EU countries who are Turkey’s trading partners. Their study covered the period 
between 1980 and 2001, yielding an unbalanced panel data set comprised of 2000 
observations. Their estimated model is as follows: 
     (9) 
 (10) 
Where:  it= imports of Turkey from country i at time t 
it= exports of Turkey to country i at time t 
             =GDP for country i at time t 
            rer= real bilateral exchange rate 
            T= Turkey 
            In= natural logarithm function 
             = dummy for EU countries, which assumes the value 1 for EU country 
and 0  otherwise.            
             = dummy for custom union, which assumes the value 1 for the period of 
CU and 0 otherwise. 
              = is the interactive dummy between the EU and custom union 
  The same methodology above is used, where both exports and imports 
functions of the BLNS countries are estimated. The idea is to investigate whether 
this agreement has affected the structure of trade of the BLNS countries with the 
RSA. The imports demand function estimated is as follows:                                                                                             
   (11) 
Where:  
            it= imports into country i (BLNS country) from the RSA 
             =GDP for country i at time t 
            rer= real bilateral exchange rate 
             = Dummy variable that takes the value one (1) for the period of EU-
SA TDCA  Zero (0) otherwise THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION - SOUTH AFRICA TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION…  
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            In= natural logarithm function 
            vit  = disturbance term 
                 α0i  = individual specific effects. These refer to unobservable individual 
specific effects which are not included in the equation because we do not know 
exactly how to specify them explicitly. Also, they do not have data on them, but we 
simply want to acknowledge their existence. 
 The export demand function estimated is as follows: 
 +   (12) 
Where:  it= country i exports to South Africa 
              = GDP for South Africa 
Estimation techniques for the time series-cross sectional data analysis 
The model used for analysis is the time series-cross sectional (TSCS) data 
model. This model analyses data observed across countries or firms in which the 
number of cross-sectional units is relatively smaller than the number of time 
periods (Greene, 2003). Time series-cross sectional data set for economic research 
possesses several major advantages over conventional time-series or cross-
sectional data. These advantages, according to Baltagi (1995) and Hsiao (1985) 
include controlling for individual heterogeneity, more informative data, more 
variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency. 
In estimating the model, this paper first starts by estimating the pooled 
ordinary least squares (POLS) model. This is a method whereby all cross sections 
are pooled together and then treated as one regression model. Although this model 
is not complicated, its estimators are likely to create complications in our 
estimation. According to Podesta (2000), OLS regression estimates are likely to be 
biased, inefficient and/or inconsistent when they are applied to pooled data. This is 
because errors for regression equations estimated from pooled data using OLS 
procedure and pooled data tend to generate certain complications. These include 
serial correlation, contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity. Errors 
might also be non random across spatial and/or temporal unit because parameters 
are heterogeneous across subsets of units (Hicks, 1994). Thus, estimating constant-
coefficient models cannot capture the causal heterogeneity across space and time.  Montseng TSOLO , Imogen Bonolo MOGOTSI , Gaotlhobogwe MOTLALENG 
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In order to take some of these issues into consideration, the test for the 
Hausman is done to solve the problem of heterogeneity. As has been shown, 
omitting to test if the countries are heterogeneous or not could lead to problems 
such as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Therefore by testing for either fixed 
effects or random effects model helps us in a way to get rid of such problems. 
 ESTIMATION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the results of time series-cross sectional data. This is in 
order to assess the impact of the EU-SA TDCA on the BLNS countries.  The paper 
uses time series-cross sectional data set that comprises of four BLNS countries. It 
covers the period 1990 to 2006, in order to analyze the import and export demand 
functions. Firstly, the pooled regression model is run with the assumption of 
heterogeneity being ruled out. This is likely to bring about biased results should 
heterogeneity exit and also if the error term does not behave as expected. To take 
into account the heterogeneity across countries, Hausman test is done in order to 
determine whether the appropriate model to use is the fixed or random effects 
model. 
Hausman test for presence of fixed effects 
The hausman test is a useful device for determining the preferred 
specification of the common effects model. That is, it is a general test procedure 
that determines whether there is any correlation between the regressors and the 
individual specific effects. Should the regressors be uncorrelated with the error 
terms, random effects model is the appropriate model. On the other hand if, the 
regressors are correlated with the error terms then fixed effects model is the correct 
model. From Table 11, the test shows random effects model to be the appropriate 
model for both exports and imports.  
Table 11 Hausman Test 
   Imports           Exports       
Test 
summary 
chi-square 
statistic 
Chi-
square 
d.f  prob. test  summary 
chi-square 
statistic 
Chi-
square 
d.f  Prob. 
cross-
section   2.27 3 0.519 cross-section  2.17 3  0.998 
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To illustrate the potential of inconsistencies arising from the use of the 
pooled model, we select the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) estimation to 
allow for comparison with results of time series-cross sectional random effects 
model estimators. The time series-cross sectional model presented accounts for 
cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation that may arise 
among the explanatory variables. Since the appropriate model was found to be 
random effects model, the approach that is used for random effects estimation is 
the generalized two- stage least squares.  
Import function 
Table 12 presents the regression results of demand for imports using both the 
pooled regression and the time series-cross sectional random effects model. When 
static pooled model is used, the coefficient of real exchange rate (RER) is not 
statistically significant while GDP is only significant at 10% level. Again, the 
results show presence of autocorrelation since the DW-statistic is less than 2. This 
is an indication that the errors are serially correlated. However, for the  time series-
cross sectional random effects model  all coefficients become significant 
determinants of the demand for imports by the BLNS countries.  There is no 
autocorrelation. These different results confirm the presence of biases and thus the 
inconsistencies linked to using static pooled data models. These inconsistencies 
may be due to the fact that POLS generate certain complications brought about by 
the error term.  
Table 12 Regression results of demand for imports using both the pooled regression and 
the time series-cross sectional random effects model 
Pooled         TSCS(REM)       
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
 log(GDP)   0.35   1.79(0.08)*   log(GDP)   1.61  3.42(0.00)*** 
 log(RER)   -0.45   -1.22(0.23)   log(RER)   -0.87   -2.51 (0.00)***
 Dum   1.53   5.04(0.00)***  Dum   0.95   4.31(0.00)*** 
R-square=0.41, Adj. R-square= 0.31  R-square= 0.64, Adj. R-square= 0.62 
F-statistic= 15.13(0.00)     F-statistic= 37.07 (0.00)    
DW-statistic= 0.29     DW-statistic= 2.1     
*** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, *indicates 
significance level at 10% 
 
The demand for imports is found to be price inelastic meaning that imports 
are not sensitive to price changes. This behavior could mean that commodities Montseng TSOLO , Imogen Bonolo MOGOTSI , Gaotlhobogwe MOTLALENG 
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imported by the BLNS countries are necessary commodities, whose demand may 
not be highly influenced by price changes. This implies that they may not have 
domestic substituting goods. Even if they have domestic substituting commodities, 
production domestically may be inefficient or there may be preferences for imports 
over domestic substitutes, so people resort to imports. While imports seem to be 
price inelastic, they are income elastic, which seems to reinforce the argument 
above that the BNLS countries are  heavily dependent on imports from RSA.  
Finally the dummy variable for the establishment of the EU-SA TDCA is 
found to be statistically significant and positive. It shows that the agreement 
between the RSA and the EU brought about trade creation to the BLNS countries. 
Trade has been created because commodities are now imported cheaply from the 
relatively low cost producer, the EU. Goods entering the RSA can easily find their 
way into the BLNS countries because of the porous nature of trade in the region.
30 
It could also mean that domestic production (within the BLNS) has been replaced 
by more competitive EU products.  
The results above could mean trade diversion if the EU is not relatively the 
lower cost producer. ie., if the  RSA previously imported from other lower cost 
countries but the FTA makes duty free imports cheaper. This increases imports 
although the EU is not the lowest cost producer. The EU could still be more 
expensive than other suppliers. Thus, trade is been diverted from the least cost 
producer to the EU. 
The increase in imports could mean that the agreement has harmed domestic 
production. Importing from the RSA is now cheaper as compared to buying 
domestically and as such domestic production is stifled. i.e., demand shifts from 
locally produced goods to foreign ones.  This would then result in local industries 
having to close down since they would not compete with the lower prices from the 
RSA. Imports from the RSA would be crowding out domestic production. 
Table 13 Export Function 
pooled         TSCS (REM)       
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
 log(GDPSA)   1.32  0.63(0.53)   Dlog(GDPSA)   7.53  2.59(0.01)** 
 log(RER)   0.81  1.72(0.09)*   log(RER)   0.67  2.04(0.04)** 
                                                      
30 There are no trade barriers between South Africa and the BLNS countries because of the fact that 
these countries are in the same custom union (SACU). The implication is that any goods  entering 
South Africa will find their way into the BLNS countries due to free movements of goods and 
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pooled         TSCS (REM)       
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
 Dum   1.30   2.23(0.03)**  Dum   1.41   9.37(0.00)*** 
R-square= 0.41, Adj. R-square= 0.39  R-square= 0.61, Adj. R-square= 0.58 
F-statistic= 15.13 (0.00)     F-statistic= 30.5 (0.00)    
DW-statistic= 0.58     DW-statistic= 2.06    
*** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, *indicates 
significance level at 10% 
 
As with the import function, the TSCS (REM) results in Table 13 are 
considered consistent for the export function, and hence these are the ones 
discussed and analyzed. The results show that all variables are statistically 
significant and their coefficients yield expected signs. The variable GDPSA, which 
measures national income of the RSA is found statistically significant at 5% level. 
It depicts that a unit increase in GDPSA increases the demand for exports of the 
BLNS countries into the RSA.  Furthermore, the demand for exports is income 
elastic. ie., the demand for exports is sensitive to changes in income of the RSA. 
That is, not only does the demand for exports to the RSA increase with RSA’s 
GDP, but it increases more than proportionately which means the RSA highly 
depends on exports of the BLNS countries. This means that exports become more 
competitive as they compete with the RSA products. Thus, increase in exports to 
the RSA as her income increases implies that domestic production within the 
BNLS countries is boosted by any increase in economic activity in the RSA. This 
may lead to increase in employment of the BLNS.  
This paper also depicts that a depreciation of the domestic currency makes 
exports cheaper. Thus, the RSA will import more from the BLNS countries due to 
the fall in price of exports of those countries. For LNS countries, this variable 
captures only the relative CPIs with the RSA. It means when prices rise less in 
those countries as opposed to the RSA, the volume of exports to the RSA increase. 
This implies that exports of the BLNS countries to the RSA become more 
competitive as they compete with the RSA’s commodities. The reason is most 
likely that BLNS commodities exported to the RSA do not have any substituting 
goods in the RSA. It could also be interpreted to mean that the RSA’s consumers 
and producers prefer exported goods of the BLNS countries as opposed to the local 
products.  Montseng TSOLO , Imogen Bonolo MOGOTSI , Gaotlhobogwe MOTLALENG 
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The demand for exports is price inelastic. For Botswana, whose currency is 
not at par with the rand, this implies that the exchange rate fluctuation is of less 
influence in determining the demand for exports to the RSA. For the LNS 
countries, on the other hand, this implies that any changes in prices of commodities 
in the LNS countries do not change much the demand for exports to the RSA.  
Finally the dummy variable indicates that the agreement has brought about 
increase in demand for exports from the BLNS countries. This increase can be 
interpreted to mean that the RSA has a wider market now as a result of the 
agreement. It fulfills it by buying more commodities from the BLNS countries. The 
RSA is facing an increased demand for exports to the EU, so in an attempt to fulfill 
that demand, it imports more from its trading partners (the BLNS countries) either 
to export to the EU as they are or after further processing. Thus the agreement can 
be said to have benefited the BLNS countries since they can now export more to 
the RSA. Hence, this has impacted positively on their economies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined the impact of the European Union-South Africa Trade 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (EU-SA TDCA) on trade patterns 
between the RSA and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). The 
investigation is carried out using pooled time series-cross sectional data for the 
periods 1990-2006. The random effects model is the method of analysis adopted. 
The findings show that demand for imports by the BNLS countries is income 
elastic and price inelastic, which implies that the BNLS countries import 
necessities from the RSA. The dummy variable for imports function is positive and 
statistically significant,  This implies that the agreement between the RSA and the 
EU brought about increased imports to the BLNS countries. Additionally, demand 
for exports is income elastic and price inelastic. The dummy variable for exports 
function is correctly signed and significant. This suggests that the volume of 
exports to the RSA, from the BLNS increased after the agreement. The 
implications of these findings are as follows. First, imports could have led to a 
crowding out of domestic production, as a result of the SA-TDCA. Also, the EU-
SA TDCA could have benefited the BLNS countries by increasing their exports. THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION - SOUTH AFRICA TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION…  
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